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Abstract -  As various applications of wireless ad hoc 
network have been proposed, security has become one of 
the big research challenges and is receiving increasing 
attention. In contrast with conventional networks, mobile 
ad hoc networks usually do not provide online access to 
trusted authorities or to centralized servers, and they 
exhibit frequent partitioning due to link and node failures 
and to node mobility. For these reasons, traditional security 
solutions that require online trusted authorities or 
certificate repositories are not well-suited for securing ad 
hoc networks.  The present approach provides for a 
distributed key management and authentication approach 
by deploying the recently developed concepts of  identity-
based cryptography and threshold secret sharing. Without 
any assumption of pre-fixed trust relationship between 
nodes, the ad hoc network works in a  self-organizing way 
to provide the key generation and key management service, 
which effectively solves the problem of single point of 
failure in the traditional public key infrastructure (PKI)-
supported system. The identity-based cryptography 
mechanism provided not only to provide end-to-end 
authenticity and confidentiality, but also saves network 
bandwidth and computational power of wireless nodes. 
 
Index Terms - Mobile ad hoc networks, security, 
authentication, Self-organized, Key Distribution, Identity 
based encryption. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
        Ad Hoc network is a self-organizing multi-hop 
wireless network, which relies neither on fixed 
infrastructure nor on predetermined connectivity.                     
          MANETs (Mobile Ad-hoc Networks) are an 
emerging research area. Currently, most of the research 
is focused on the development of a suitable MAC layer, 
as well as potential applications ranging from collision 
avoidance to onboard infotainment services. In fact, 
there are very few academic publications describing the 
security architecture of MANETs [1,2,3]; none of them 
proposes specific protocols or considers practical issues 
such as key sizes and authentication delays.  
       Some  recent  papers [4,5] focus on particular 
subjects in mobile node security without defining the big 
picture where the proposed solutions would fit. A 
security architecture based on a PKI for digital 
tachograph systems is proposed in [5].  One of these 
challenges is security; very little attention    [3, 6] has 
been devoted so far to the security of mobile nodes. Yet, 
security is crucial.  
          These concerns may look similar to those 
encountered in other communication networks, but they 
are not. Indeed, the size of the network, the speed of the 
nodes, the relevance of their geographic position, the 
very sporadic connectivity between them, and the 
unavoidably slow deployment make the problem very 
novel and challenging.  
 
A. Key Distribution 
 
     The use of wireless links makes MANETs susceptible 
to attack. Eavesdroppers can access secret information, 
violating network confidentiality. Hackers can directly 
attack the network to delete messages, inject erroneous 
messages, or impersonate a node, which violates 
availability, integrity, authentication, and non 
repudiation. Compromised nodes also can launch attacks 
from within a network. 
     On-demand and link-state routing algorithms do not 
specify a scheme to protect data or sensitive routing 
information. Because any centralized entity could lead to 
significant vulnerability in MANETs, a security solution 
must be based on the principle of distributed trust. 
Although no single node in a MANET is trustworthy, 
threshold cryptography can distribute trust to an 
aggregation of nodes. This scheme lets n parties share 
the ability to perform a cryptographic operation such that 
any t parties can do it together, while up to t - 1 parties 
cannot perform the operation. However, dividing a 
private key into n shares and constructing t  partial 
signatures is nontrivial given that traditional key 
distribution schemes either do not apply to the ad hoc 
scenario or are not efficient for resource-constrained 
devices. 
      Combining identity-based techniques with threshold 
cryptography can achieve flexible and efficient key 
distribution. After distribution, a combiner can verify the 
t  signatures and compute the final signature for the 
certificate. In this way, up to t - 1 compromised nodes 
cannot generate a valid certificate by themselves. If a 
large number of nodes are compromised, attributing fault 
to a specific malicious node is impossible. 
            A proposed algorithm addresses this problem by 
limiting the possible fault location to the link between 
two adjacent nodes; as long as a fault-free path exists 
between two nodes, they can establish a secure 
communication link even if most nodes in the network 
are compromised. In addition, this algorithm can detect 
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selfish nodes that refuse to cooperate with other nodes. If 
their behavior is the result of a denial-of-service attack 
rather than power-savings activity, the algorithm can 
isolate the selfish nodes. 
      Ad hoc network and in particular wireless mobile ad-
hoc network - has unique characteristic and constraint 
that make traditional cryptographic mechanisms and 
assumptions inappropriate. In particular, it may not be 
warranted to assume pre-existing shared secrets between 
member of the network and the presence of a common 
PKI. Thus, the issue of key distribution in ad-hoc 
networks represents an important problem.  
     Unfortunately, this issue has been largely ignored; as 
an example, most protocols for secure ad-hoc routing 
assume that key distribution has already taken place. 
Traditional key distribution schemes either do not apply 
in an ad-hoc scenario or are not efficient enough for 
mall, resource-constrained devices.  
          The proposed model combine efficient techniques 
from identity-based (ID-based) and threshold 
cryptography to provide a mechanism that enables 
flexible and efficient key distribution while respecting 
the constraints of ad-hoc network. 
 
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
 
       In this thesis a system model is proposed in which 
several mobile nodes that are communicating locally, via 
an ad hoc wireless network, and globally, via a fixed 
infrastructure wireless network.  
       Each mobile nodes forms, around itself, a local area 
of communication. Mobile nodes that are further away, 
although they may constitute part of a neighbor’s local 
area, are not part of that particular node’s 
communication network. All nodes broadcast 
information omni-directionally and receive data from all 
directions. There is no point-to-point communication 
link. The purpose of the ad hoc network is to impart 
information, i.e., the mobile node’s vital signs, to nodes 
in close proximity and to receive the same data from 
them. The information is processed locally to provide the 
user with a map indicating the status of each node in the 
immediate vicinity, e.g., speed, signal status, etc.  
       In addition to the local ad hoc network, each mobile 
node also communicates, at a much lower frequency 
rate, with the infrastructure network in order to upload 
its vital signs. This data is used by the infrastructure for 
maintaining the global database about the mobile nodes.  
It also constitutes the highly dynamic database that users 
can query to extract the various details about the mobile 
nodes.  
       There are two extreme ways to introduce security in 
mobile ad hoc networks: through a single authority 
domain, where certificates and/or keys are issued by a 
single authority, typically in the system setup phase or   
through full self-organization, where security does not 
rely on any trusted authority or fixed server, not even in 
the initialization phase. Self-organizing public-key 
management system  that allows users to create, store, 
distribute, and revoke their public keys without the help 
of any trusted authority or fixed server. 
           Finally, the proposed system model develop a fully 
self-organized key distribution system that allows users 
to generate their public-private key pairs, to issue 
certificates, and to perform authentication regardless of 
the network partitions and without any centralized 
services. In this scheme, the identity of the user is used 
as the public key which makes the key management 
easier and does not require certificates for implementing 
key revocation. This minimizes the overhead of 
conventional PKCS and becomes an attractive scheme 
for mobile and resource constrained devices.                               
                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IP Network 
 
 Mobile Gateway 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 1.  System Model 
 
A.  System Constraints 
 
      The  proposed  system  model  deals  with  an 
environment that is very dynamic and composed of 
mobile nodes. This results in rapidly changing 
network topologies. In addition, data exchanged 
between the mobile nodes is extremely time sensitive. 
At first, the above appears to simplify the problem 
since all data is broadcast one hop and no routing is 
involved. There are, however, some concerns. 
Primarily, the throughput of the system and the delays 
involved are important since the data is time sensitive, 
and in many cases, of urgent nature. Therefore, the 
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system must be robust and must have the capacity to 
support the traffic load and its    time-critical needs. 
      More  complex,  multi-channel  systems  that  can 
handle the traffic load and its delay constraints, pose a 
different set of constraints associated with the speed 
with which mobile nodes can associate themselves to 
the different channels and maintain an up to date 
picture of their surroundings. 
      From  the  information  infrastructure  perspective, 
the proposed model can be seen as a highly distributed 
and dynamic database where a large number of data 
sources generate status information which is then 
consumed at different levels of aggregations The data 
sources may themselves store information acting as 
smaller databases, or alternatively, periodically 
migrate the information to the backbone storage and 
computation units. 
      The system environment also poses a number of 
security and privacy related constraints. At the same 
time, all information provided whether by the mobile 
nodes or by the infrastructure must be authentic, i.e., 
both the source and the integrity of the information 
must be evident and verifiable.  
 
III. DEVELOPMENT PHASES 
 
            The development of the system consists of the 
following phases. 
 
A.  Access to Fixed Infrastructure  
 
        A fixed infrastructure, comprised of (at least) a 
number of base stations strategically positioned in 
close proximity is necessary to facilitate the upload of 
data from the mobile nodes.  
 
B.  Automatic Key Distribution        
 
        Automatic key distribution allows users to create, 
store, distribute, and revoke their public keys without 
the help of any trusted authority or fixed server. All 
the mobile nodes have the same role. Automatic key 
distribution in the mobile ad hoc networks allows 
users to fully control the security settings of the 
system. This approach is developed mainly for “open” 
networks, in which mobile nodes can join and leave 
the network without any centralized control. 
        The  present  approach  comprises  of  two 
components: distributed key generation and identity-
based authentication. The key generation component 
provides the network master key pair and the 
public/private key pair to each node in a distributed 
way. The generated private keys are used for 
authentication. Identity-based authentication 
mechanism provides end-to-end authentication and 
confidentiality between the communication nodes. If 
the authentication process succeeds, the 
communication nodes exchange a session key, which 
can be used for future communication. 
        Each  mobile  node  forms  around  itself,  a  local 
area network for communication. Every mobile node 
has a unique IP address or identity when it joins the 
network. Each node within the network needs to 
obtain its personal private key corresponding to its 
identity and register to the network before utilizing 
any network service. A network can be formed by a 
number of mobile nodes at a particular time. Each 
network is assigned with a unique identification such 
as NETID. The mobile nodes within the particular 
network can communicate with each other through the 
base stations of that region which has its unique 
identity. 
        Consider an ad hoc network with n nodes in the 
initial phase. The network has a public/private key 
pair, called master key <PK, SK>, which is used to 
provide key generation service to all the nodes in the 
network. The master key pair is generated in such a 
manner that the master PK is well known to all the 
nodes in the network, and the master private key SK is 
shared by all of them in a (k, n) threshold fashion. 
Each of them holds a unique secret share of the master 
private key SK, and no one is able to reconstruct the 
master private key based on its own information.  
        The master key is formed by the combination of 
unique identities of the mobile node, network and the 
nearest base station. Since we would like to make this 
public key information well known to the whole 
network, each node broadcasts its key information to 
the network. The master key has a dual nature ie it can 
act as both public and private with respect to the 
scenario to be considered. For example, when a 
mobile node is considered, the IP address of it 
becomes the public key and the combination of both 
the network and the base station identities form the 
private key. Whereas   the network is considered, the 
NETID becomes the public key and the combination 
of other two will act as a private key. When a node 
moves from one network to another then the key gets 
varied as per the network and the nearest base station. 
 
Algorithm: Key Generation & Distribution 
 
Step 1: Each node generates its own public and private    
            key pair using the master key <Pk, Sk> [Master  
            key is formed by the combination of unique      
            identities of mobile node, network and the     
            nearest base station]. 
Step 2: Each node broadcasts its key information to  
            the network. 
Step 3: The public key of each node is its IP                   
            address and the private key is combination of   
            NETID and base station ID. 
Step 4: If a new node joins a network it submits it     
           broadcasts its identity to its neighbor nodes. 
Step 5: The neighbor node replies with master public  
            Key to enable the new node to generate its  
            master private key 
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   Step 6: New node generates its master private key  
              and it broadcasts its master key pair to its      
              neighbors 
 
   Step 7: If verification process is successful then the  
              nodes identity is authenticated 
 
     When a new node joins a network, it presents its 
identity  and some other required physical proof 
(depending on key issuing policy) to k neighbor nodes 
and requests PKG service, the master public key and 
its share of the master private key. Each node in the 
coalition verifies the identity of the new node. If the 
verification process succeeds, the private key can be 
generated using the above said method. 
       All the keys generated in the previous phase are 
used for authentication. Authentication enables a 
mobile node to ensure the identity of the peer node it 
is communicating with, so that no attacker could 
masquerade a node, thus gaining unauthorized access 
to resource and sensitive information. Our approach 
using identity-based encryption provides end-to-end 
authentication. 
 
IV. SIMULATION SETUP AND RESULTS 
      The ns-2 network simulator was used to evaluate 
the proposed mechanism.. The aim of the simulation is 
to determine average case performances of the scheme 
with regards to its effectiveness in automatic key 
distribution among the mobile nodes.  
      This tool uses a simplified model: In the following 
simulation scenarios, the trace is generated for a 10km 
long highway with three lanes. The average mobile 
node speed is 20ms. 
      The  main  steps  of  creating  a  ns  scenario are: 
creating the event scheduler, setting up trace support, 
creating network, creating connection, creating 
transport agents, creating traffic(application), and 
launch the simulator. 
     The Simulation setup involves the four operations: 
 Defining the mobile node configuration  
 Defining node location and movement 
 Key Formation 
 Defining the traffic patterns  
       In  order  to  determine  how  well  the  proposed 
algorithm performs under various conditions, three 
different scenarios were generated by considering the 
following factors: 
(i)  Throughput 
(ii)  Data Loss 
(iii) Delay 
     Each successive scenario increased the number of 
mobile nodes in the network. Furthermore, two set of 
simulations were conducted. The first set of 
simulations compared the performance of the 
proposed mechanism based on the distance between 
the nodes. The second set of simulations examined the 
effect of mobility. When the number of nodes gets 
increased, then the throughput gets decreased  
 
TABLE 1.  
NUMBER OF NODES Vs. THROUGHPUT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  No-of-nodes Vs. Throughput 
 
 
TABLE 2.    
MOBILITY Vs. THROUGHPUT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Figure 3. Mobility Vs. Throughput 
 
 
TABLE  3.   
DISTANCE Vs. DELAY 
 
Distance 
(ms) 
Delay 
(s) 
51.8233 16 
63.7207 18 
88.1189 20 
 
No-of-
Nodes 
Throughput 
( No. of packets / s ) 
8 3578 
10 3502 
12 3397 
Mobility 
(ms) 
Throughput 
(No.of packets/s) 
10 2439 
20 1822 
30 1803 
40 1789 
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Figure 4. Distance Vs. Delay 
 
 
TABLE 4.   
MOBILITY Vs. DELAY 
 
Mobility 
(ms) 
Delay 
(s) 
10 69 
20 53 
30 31 
40 21 
 
Figure 5. Mobility Vs. Delay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, an approach has been   
implemented for key distribution and for better 
authentication of MANET security. The proposed 
algorithm for key distribution which guarantees the 
ability for an arbitrary pair of devices to exchange a 
key in a secure fashion.. This process is achieved 
without the prior knowledge of the maximum 
MANET size. 
The ad hoc wireless network can grow 
incrementally and also reduce if the mobile node 
participated in one ad hoc is detached due to the node 
movement from one zone to another. Adding a new 
node  to the wireless ad hoc network requires the 
user’s signal detection in the zone and the validity of 
the authenticated key to perform the key exchange, 
fulfilling our “ease of use” requirement. 
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